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Individual Involved in
Matter of Legitimate Public Interest Must Prove Actual
Malice to Recover for Defamation in Mississippi. Ferguson
v. Watkins, 448 So. 2d 271 (Miss. 1984)
LIBEL -

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

FACTS1

Physicians Drs. Robert P. Tate, Charles B. Ferguson and David
S. Anderson directed emergency room medical services at Marshall County Hospital. The hospital had operated at a loss for
several years before Alvin Word III was hired as its administrator on June 1, 1977.
One of Word's principal assignments was to get the essentially
publically funded hospital into good financial shape. In doing this,
the administrator "stepped on some toes," including those of the
physicians. This conflict led the physicians, who as a group were
paid $135,000 a year to keep the emergency services available
after hours, to deliver an ultimatum. They sent a letter to the hospital Board of Trustees stating it is "him or us."' The letter was
sent in April and Word's contract was not renewed. He left the
hospital's employ after his initial year. About two weeks after
Word's departure from the hospital, the North Mississippi Times,
a weekly newspaper with a limited circulation in Marshall County,
published a column by William E. Watkins.' The article was very
critical of the county government, which provided substantial funding for the hospital, and it also criticized the physicians for their
efforts to have Word removed and for their operation of the emergency room. The article stated the physicians had a "lucrative"
position operating the emergency room and the author understood
why they had wanted Word to leave because "I wouldn't want
someone to come along and tear up my little playhouse either." 4
The physicians brought suit for libel against the author Watkins,
the newspaper's editor and North Mississippi Communications,
I. The facts are taken from the court's opinion in Ferguson v. Watkins, 448 So. 2d 271 (Miss. 1984).
2. Id. at 273.
3. Id. at 281. The complete article appears in an appendix to the majority opinion. However, the paragraphs which referred to the plaintiffs stated:
I get the feeling that Marshall County taxpayers are being raked over the coals with this emergency
room operation. To be guaranteed $135,000 for three internists to man the emergency room from 5
p.m. to 8 a.m. weekdays and 24 hours on weekends, seems very lucrative especially insomuch as
the doctors are not at the hospital but rather available for immediate response if needed. I don't blame
Drs. Robert Tate, David Anderson and Charlie Ferguson for wanting to get rid of Alvin Word Il,
as if I had such a good set-up I wouldn't want someone to come along and tear up my little playhouse
either.
Id.
4. See supra note 3.
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Inc., the publisher, based on the contents of the article. The trial
judge vacated a January 1981 jury verdict for each of the individual
plaintiffs.' He entered instead a judgment for nominal damages
and "lawful costs," finding that no special damages were required
because the statements were libelous per quod and not per se.6
The plaintiffs appealed, and the Mississippi Supreme Court stated that the only issue was whether the vacated judgment should
be reinstated. 7 The court affirmed the trial court's order on two
independent grounds: the statements in the article were not
libelous,' or assuming the statements were libelous, the physicians were vortex public figures9 who could not recover for failure
to prove that Watkins, the editor or the publisher acted with actual malice.1 ° The court defined the vortex public figure as "[a]ny
person who becomes involved, voluntarily or involuntarily, in any
matter of legitimate public interest -and this certainly includes
the method of administration of any program of services financed
in whole or in substantial part by public monies.""
This Note will be limited to a discussion of the court's adoption of the vortex public figure standard alternatively referred to
as a limited purpose public figure. First this Note will trace the
development of a limited purpose public figure as a constitutional doctrine involving protection of freedom of the press. The Note
will then deal with unresolved problems in applying this standard,
and finally, will turn to a discussion of the Mississippi Supreme
Court's adaptation of the limited purpose public figure and its
strengths and short-comings.
EVOLUTION OF THE LIMITED PURPOSE PUBLIC FIGURE

The modern law of libel and constitutional protection for false

5. Watkins, 448 So. 2d at 274. The jury had awarded a $6,500 judgment for Tate, and $5,000 each to
Ferguson and Anderson.
6. Id. at 274. The court did not address what, if any, distinction Mississippi law provides concerning libel
per quod and libel per se. Generally, libel per se is the publication of matter which is defamatory on its face
and unambiguous, and generally involves a presumption of harm. Libel per quod generally involves the publication of matter innocent on its face and which becomes defamatory only to those who are aware of extrinsic
facts that make the publication defamatory. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW

795-96 (5th ed. 1984).
Watkins, 448 So. 2d at 275.
Id. at 276.
Id. at 279.
Id.
Id. at 278.

OF TORTS

7.
8.
9.
10.
It.
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statements of facts originated in New York Times v. Sullivan."
In that case the Court dealt with a defamation action brought by
the Montgomery, Alabama Commissioner of Public Affairs against
a New York newspaper and four civil rights leaders for some false
statements printed in an advertisement." The statements falsely
depicted police actions and though they did not mention the plaintiff by name, he argued the false statements were imputed to him
since he was in charge of the department."4
Speaking for the Court, Justice Brennan stated the Constitution required a different standard in assessing whether a public
official, as opposed to a private individual, could recover for defamation:"5
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct
unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual malice"-that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."

Such a guarantee was mandated by our "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust and wide open." 17 Uninhibited debate requires
that protection be afforded erroneous statements to provide the
needed "breathing space" for freedom of expression."
The requirement of proof of actual malice to establish libel was
extended to include public figures, as well as public officials, in
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,19 decided jointly with Associated
Press v. Walker. Butts was a college athletic director employed
by a private corporation who alleged that he had been libeled in
a story detailing how he had helped to fix a college football game."0
12. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). One author in a separate text commented that:
The Supreme Court of the United States on March 9, 1964, in an attempt to bring order and cohesion
to the jurisprudence of libel, extended to citizens everywhere a constitutional privilege to falsely defame
public officials. The privilege, however, was conditional. As declared by the Court . . . it existed
only so long as the false libels were about officials' public conduct and were published without actual
malice... [i]n
effect, the Court had issued a new character of freedom to allow people to make mistatements of fact in even scandalous, contemptuous criticism of public officials.
C.

LAWTHORNE, THE SUPREME COURT AND LIBEL 26 (1981).

13. 376 U.S. at 256.
14. Id. at 258.
15. Id. at 279.
16. Id. at 279-80. The Court required that the plaintiff demonstrate the actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Actual malice was later interpreted to require that the publisher of the false statement actually
"entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication." St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
The Court recently held that a court ruling on a motion for summary judgment where the plaintiff must prove
actual malice "must be guided by the New York Tmes 'clear and convincing' evidentiary standard in determining whether a genuine issue of actual malice exists - that is, whether .. . a reasonable jury might find that
actual malice had been shown." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2515 (1986).
17. 376 U.S. at 270.
18. Id. at 272.
19. 388 U.S. 130 (1967), reh'g denied, 389 U.S. 889 (1967).
20. Id. at 135-36.
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In the companion case, Walker claimed he had been libeled in
a story which he alleged falsely depicted him as inciting a crowd
to riot during racial controversy at the University of Mississippi.21
Although there was no majority opinion, 2 "seven members of
the Court who deem[ed] it necessary to pass upon the question
agree[d] that [Butts and Walker] are 'public figures' for First
Amendment purposes." 3 Public figures' "views and actions with
respect to public issues and events are often of as much concern
to the citizen as the attitudes and behavior of 'public officials' with
respect to the same issues and events." 24 Justice Harlan noted that
Butts and Walker commanded continuing public interest and possessed sufficient media access to rebut the falsehoods, "Walker,
by reason of thrusting his personality into the 'vortex' of an important public controversy.""
The Court split on the issue of what standard of fault should
apply in cases involving a public figure plaintiff in a state libel
case, but a majority applied the actual malice standard of New
York Times. 6
To this point the Court had focused on the plaintiffs characteristics in delineating a standard of fault that applied to "public
officials" and "public figures." However, in Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc. ,27 the Court expanded the New York Times standard to "all discussion and communication involving matters of
public or general concern, without regard to whether the persons
involved are famous or anonymous." 8
Rosenbloom involved a libel suit brought against a radio station
21. Id. at 140.
22. Justices Clark, Stewart and Fortas joined Justice Harlan's announcement for the Court. Id. at 133. Chief
Justice Warren concurred in the public figure characterization as did Justices Brennan and White. Justice Black,
who was joined by Justice Douglas, concurred in the Court's reversal of the judgment in the Walker case. Justice
Black reiterated his position that "it is time for this Court to abandon New York Times v. Sullivan and adopt
the rule to the effect that the First Amendment was intended to leave the press free from the harrassment of
libel judgments." Id. at 172.
23. Id. at 162 (Warren, C.J.,concurring).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 155.
26. Chief Justice Warren, joined by Justices Brennan and White in a joint concurring opinion, and Justices
Black and Douglas in a joint concurring opinion so held. However, Justices Black and Douglas would have
preferred adoption of a first amendment rule freeing the press from libel suits. Id. at 172. Justices Harlan,
Clark, Stewart and Fortas would have used a standard requiring a showing of "highly unreasonable conduct
constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by
responsible publishers." Id. at 155.
27. 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (plurality opinion). See Lawthorne, supra note 12, at 72-80.
28. 403 U.S. at 44. The decision in Rosenbloom followed the Court's decision in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374 (1967), that private individuals involved in a matter of public interest could not recover under a New
York privacy statute for material and substantial falsification without a showing of actual malice under the
New York limes test. The Court in Hill left open the question of whether a private individual involved in a
matter of public interest would also have to prove New Yor* limes actual malice to recover for libel. Hill,
385 U.S. at 390-91. See J. NowA, R. ROTUNDA & J.YOUNG, CONSITUTIONAL LAw, n.47 at 949 (2d ed. 1983).
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by a magazine distributor because the station's newscasts characterized some of the distributor's magazines as obscene, and because
reports of the distributor's suit to prevent police from interfering
in his business also characterized Rosenbloom and his business
associates as "smut distributors" and "girlie-book peddlers." 9
The news broadcasts had been the result of Rosenbloom's arrest
as part of a "series of enforcement actions under the city's obscenity
laws" by the Philadelphia Police Department."0
Though no opinion garnered more than three votes,"' a majority
upheld the court of appeals decision that a jury verdict for Rosenbloom be set aside because Rosenbloom was required to meet the
New York Times standard and failed to meet that standard as a
matter of law.3
Justice White characterized the first amendment considerations
after Rosenbloom as follows:
[l]t would seem that at least five members of the Court would support each of the following rules: For public officers and public figures to recover for damage to their reputations
for libelous falsehoods, they must prove either knowing or reckless disregard of the truth.
All other plaintiffs must prove at least negligent falsehood, but if the publication about
them was in an area of legitimate public interest, then they too must prove deliberate or
reckless error. In all actions for libel or slander, actual damages must be proved, and awards
of punitive damages will be strictly limited."

Justice Brennan's plurality opinion stated the expansion of the
actual malice protection to reporting of matters of general or public
concern is based on the public's interest in the event," and the
realization that "[t]he New York Times standard was applied to
libel . . . to give effect to the [First] Amendment's function to
encourage ventilation of public issues, not because the public offi-

29. 403 U.S. at 36.
30. Id. at 32-33.
31. Justice Brennan announced the Court's decision in an opinion joined by Justice Blackmun and the Chief
Justice. Justice Black concurred citing his position announced in New York Times v. Sullivan and Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts. Id. at 57 (Black, J., concurring). Justice White concurred but stated the Court went too
far and he would hold that the New York Tmes standard would apply, regardless of whether a private individual
was involved, if the press "report and comment upon the official actions of public servants." Id. at 62 (White,
J., concurring). Justice Harlan filed a separate dissenting opinion. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Stewart,
dissented. Justice Douglas took no part in the decision.
32. Id. at 40.
33. Id. at 59 (White, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 43.
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cial has any less interest 35in protecting his reputation than an individual in private life."
A negligence standard suggested by Justice Harlan was rejected
because the plurality thought a negligence standard would not provide sufficient "breathing space" to first amendment values. 36 The
dissenters' suggestion of limiting recovery for private individuals
37
to only actual damages was thought to promote a chilling effect.
However, a broad interpretation of "public or general concern"
and the addition to the Court of Justice Powel 3 8 followed, and
two years after Rosenbloom was decided, the Court granted certiorari in the case of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., to "reconsider
the extent of a publisher's constitutional privilege against liability
for defamation of a private citizen."39 In essence, the Court in
Gertz adopted the dissenters' view from Rosenbloom. °
In Gertz, a Chicago attorney, Gertz, who was prominent in some
circles, was retained to represent the family of a youth killed by
a police officer in a civil suit against the officer. Attorney Gertz
took no part in the officer's criminal trial nor did he speak with
the press. His only involvement in the matter was as the family's
counsel in the civil action. 1 However, a report in a John Birch
Society publication concerning the criminal trial falsely reported
Gertz's affiliation with Marxist and communist organizations."
The Court, speaking through Justice Powell, rejected the Rosenbloom plurality's extension of the actual malice standard in state
defamation actions involving private individuals."
Instead, the Court left it to the states to decide the basis of liability so long as they neither imposed liability without fault" nor
allowed damages without a showing of actual injury, unless actual
35. Id. at 46. The Court, citing Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1966), stated that a distinction
based on the "public" nature of the plaintiff could distort first amendment precepts:
Voluntarily or not, we are all "public" men to some degree. Conversely, some aspects of the lives
of even the most public men fall outside the area of matters of public or general concern . . . (iln
any event, [a public figure-private individual] distinction could easily produce the paradoxical result
of dampening discussion of issues of public or general concern because they happen to involve private
citizens while extending constitutional encouragement to discussion of aspects of the lives of "public
figures" that are not in the area of public or general concern.
Id. at 48.
36. Id. at 52. Justice Harlan, in a separate dissenting opinion, suggested a reasonable care standard be applied where the litigant seeking redress was a private individual. Id. at 72.
37. Id. at 52-53.
supra note 12, at 79-80.
38. See generally, LAWTRHORNE,
39. 418 U.S. 323, 325 (1974).
40. "[Flor all practical purposes, the Court had adopted the view of the dissenters in the Rosenbloom case."
LAWTHORNE, supra note 12, at 81. See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CO NSTITUTIONAL LAW 638 (1978).

41.
42.
43.
44.

418 U.S. at 325-26.
Id. at 326.
Id. at 346.
418 U.S. at 347.
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malice was involved.4" Throughout the Court's opinion are references to the balancing of the state's interest in compensating the
injury to an individual's reputation with constitutional
requirements. 6

The Court clearly rejected the Rosenbloom "public or general
concern" standard as a constitutional requirement. ' However, the
Court left the states free to set their own standard of fault for private persons, including, if they wished, the Rosenbloom standard.'
Five states have adopted a Rosenbloom-based test in light of
Gertz.

49

45. 418 U.S. at 349. The Court also required that "[states may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard
Id.
forthetruth."
46. The Court considered strict liability as a constitutionally impermissible standard. "This approach provides a more equitable boundary between the competing concerns involved here. It recognizes the strength
of the legitimate state interest ... yet shields the press and broadcast media from the rigors of strict liability
for defamation." 418 U.S. at 347-48.
47. "The extension of the New York Times test proposed by the Rosenbloom plurality would abridge this
legitimate state interest to a degree that we find unacceptable." Id. at 346. The Court thought the Rosenbloom
standard would require an ad hoc determination of "what information is relevant to self-government" and also
doubted "the wisdom of committing this task to the conscience of judges." Id.
48. 418 U.S. at 347. See Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450 (1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975), overruled in part, Diversified Management, Inc. v. Denver Post, Inc., 653
P.2d 1103, 1106 (Colo. 1982), where the court stated "[wie find Gertz slightly enigmatic in that it permits
us to rule-as we do here rule - contrary to some of the opinions expressed therein." Walker, 188 Colo. at
96, 538 P.2d at 456. But see Collins and Drusall, The Reaction of the State Courts to Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 28 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 306, 326-28 (1978), for an argument that states have no compelling rationale
to retain a Rosenbloom standard.
49. Colorado, Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 .Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450 (1975) (stories and letters to the editor chiding antique store owner for not returning unwittingly acquired stolen goods), cert. denied
423 U.S. 1025 (1975), overruled in part, Diversified Management, Inc. v. Denver Post, Inc., 653 P.2d 1103,
1106 (Colo. 1982); Indiana, Aafco Heating and Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 162
Ind. App. 671, 321 N.E.2d 580 (1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Michigan, Peisner v. Detroit Free
Press, Inc., 82 Mich. App. 153, 266 N.W.2d 693 (Mich. App. 1978) (attorney appointed in criminal case
fell under state privilege to report on matters of public interest); New York, Chapadeau v. Utica ObserverDispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975) (school teacher's arrest on drug
offense) (also requiring a showing that publication was made in grossly irresponsible manner); Utah, Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968 (Utah 1981) (limited range of public interest privilege did not extend to
television station's report concerning mistreatment of horses on private ranch).
The vast majority of states, however, have adopted a negligence standard where private individuals are involved: Arizona, Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 114 Ariz. 309, 560 P.2d 1216 (1977) (involving a
car dealer and erroneous statements concerning his method of resolving complaints); Arkansas, Dodrill v.
Arkansas Democrat Co., 265 Ark. 628, 590 S.W.2d 840 (1979) (erroneous report that attorney suspended
from law practice failed reinstatement examination), cert. denied sub. nom. Little Rock Newspapers, Inc. v.
Dodrill, 444 U.S. 1076 (1980); California, Vegod Corp. v. American Broadcasting Co., 25 Cal. App. 3d 763,
603 P.2d 14, 160 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 886 (1980) (where the court rejected the Rosenbloom standard in suit involving going out of business sale at a "Landmark" store); Connecticut, Corbett v.
Register Publishing Co., 33 Conn. Supp. 4, 356 A.2d 472 (1975) (son of youth division police officer erroneously reported to have been arrested); Florida, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Ane, 423 So. 2d 376 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (plaintiff was erroneously reported to have recently purchased a truck confiscated by
police and containing marijuana); Hawaii, Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 56 Hawaii 522, 543 P.2d
1356 (1975) (radio comment that implied plaintiff and family were communists); Illinois, Troman v. Wood,
62 I11.2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975) (owner of house implicated as home of neighborhood gang); Kentucky,
McCall v. Courier-Journal and Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
975 (1982) (report that attorney would fix criminal case); Maryland, Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md.
580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976) (statement by plaintiffs former employer to present employer); Massachusetts, Stone
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Thus, the Court maintained a constitutional standard for public officials and public figures, but allowed states to set their own
standards of fault for suits involving private individuals.
The Court stressed the differences between public and private
individuals as reasons the latter deserve a lesser proof requirement."0 But the Court's attempt to provide a test to help distinguish between public and private individuals for purposes of
applying the different standards has been said to suffer from some
of the same problems as the rejected Rosenbloom test."5
The Court in Gertz identified two types of public figures: persons
who gained such pervasive powers and influence in society to be
public figures for all purposes and those more common public
figures who have "thrust themselves to the forefront of particular
public controversies
in order to influence the resolution of the
52
involved."
issues
Since Gertz, the Supreme Court has given several examples of
the class of persons subjected to proving actual malice by virtue
3 the Court held
of being public figures. In Time, Inc. v. Firestone"
v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 67 Mass. 849, 330 N.E.2d 161 (1975) (city redevelopment authority official erroneously reported to own drugs his son was.being prosecuted concerning); Montana, Madison v. Yunker,
180 Mont. 54, 589 P.2d 126 (1978) (student newspaper called plaintiff a congenital liar); New Hampshire,
McCusker v. Valley News, 121 N.H. 258, 428 A.2d 493 (1981) (story stating deputy sheriff was being paid
though he was unable to work), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1017 (1981); Ohio, Thomas H. Maloney & Sons, Inc.
v. E.W. Scripps Co., 43 Ohio App. 2d 105, 334 N.E.2d 494 (1974) (Rosenbloom standard did not apply to
private contractor and reports of his mistake of demolishing the wrong building), cert. denied 423 U.S. 883
(1975); Oklahoma, Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1976) (broadcasts of complaint that
pet store owner was unethical); New Mexico, Marchiondo v. Brown, 98 N.M. 394, 649 P.2d 462 (1982) (article imputing to plaintiff a crime and other unprofessional conduct); South Carolina, Jones v. Sun Publishing
Co., 278 S.C. 12, 292 S.E.2d 23 (1982) (plaintiff falsely reported to have pled guilty to charges of copyright
infringement), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 944 (1982); Tennessee, Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d
412 (Tenn. 1978) (implication that wife's gunshot wound was the result of an extramarital affair); Texas, Poe
v. San Antonio Express-News Corp., 590 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), writ of error refused, (story
stated teacher had fondled female students); Utah, Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968 (Utah 1981) (negligence standard of fault applied where story did not come under limited public interest privilege); Washington,
Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 546 P.2d 81 (1976) (story implied that vacationing, financially troubled plaintiff had skipped town on creditors); Wisconsin, Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 318
N.W.2d 141 (1982) (story stated plaintiff-shareholder was fired by employer who was subject of plaintiffs
shareholder suit), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 883 (1982); Washington, D.C., Phillips v. Evening Star Newspaper
Co., 424 A.2d 78 (D.C. 1980) (story stated plaintiff arrested for homicide in wife's accidental shooting death),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 989 (1981).
50. 418 U.S. at 344-45. The Court went on to state:
Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become apublic figure through no purposeful action
of his own, but the instances of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare .... Some
occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all
purposes. More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of
particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved..
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 (emphasis added).
5 i. See L. TPIBE, supra note 40, at 644. "Now judges are asked to determine whether a controversy is
'public,' a determination indistinguishable to the naked eye from whether the subject matter is of public or
general concern." Id.; Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 590 (1st Cir. 1980);
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 488 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
52. 418 U.S. at 345.
53. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
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that the wife of a well-known businessman was not a public figure
for purposes of an allegedly defamatory story about her suit for
divorce."4 The Court looked to the nature of the event and found
that marriage dissolution was not the type of public controversy
the Court referred to in Gertz.5 The Firestone divorce was not
a public issue. Consequently, Mrs. Firestone was not constitutionally required to prove actual malice to prevail in her libel suit.
Similarly, in Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc. ,5"a man
who had been called before a grand jury investigating communist
activities in 1958 and who failed to answer a subpoena for health
reasons was not a public figure for purposes of a book which 20
years later referred to him as a Soviet agent. 7 Justice Blackmun
characterized the Court's holding in Wolston as follows: "A person
becomes a limited-purpose public figure only if he literally or
figuratively 'mounts a rostrum' to advocate a particular view." 5
9
The Court went one step further in Hutchinson v. Proxmire."
There, a research behavioral scientist who obtained a federal grant
to study aggression and reactions to stress in monkeys had results
of his study published in scientific journals. The Court held he
was not a public figure for purposes of a libel action against a
United States senator who publicly questioned the wisdom of the
expenditure.' Concern about general public expenditures, without
more, is not sufficient controversy to make a public grant recipient
a public figure.61

54. Id. at 455.
55. Id. at 454.
56. 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
57. The Court found that petitioner assumed no special prominence in any public question, he did not try
to draw attention to himself to invite comment, nor did he seek to arouse public sentiment in his favor. Id. at 168.
58. 443 U.S. at 169 (Blackmun, J.,concurring).
59. 443 U.S. III (1979).
60. The Court found the only controversy involved in the case was concern about general public expenditures. "But that concern is shared by most and relates to most public expenditures; it is not sufficient to make
Hutchinson a public figure." Id. at 135. This would extend the public figure distinction to anyone benefiting
from a public grant, which the Court stated was rejected in earlier decisions. Id. The Court reserved judgment
on whether Hutchinson was a public official because neither the district court nor the court of appeals had
ruled on the question. Id. at 119.
61. Id. at 135. The court also stressed that Hutchinson had not assumed "any role of public prominence"
in the expenditure question. Id.
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Despite considerable guidance from the Supreme Court, lower
courts continue to struggle with the issue of who is and who is
not a limited-purpose public figure.2
One suggested test would look to five factors, including access
to communicative avenues to counteract the defamatory statements
and the necessity of an existing controversy prior to the defamatory publication.' Judge Karlton's thoughtful analysis yields a definition which regards access to media channels as only relevant
evidence of status and not part of the definition of a limited-purpose
public figure." One circuit court of appeals is uncertain whether
the intent to influence is determinative or merely a significant factor in deciding limited-purpose public figure status. 5
Though precision in establishing a working definition of a
limited-purpose public figure may be lacking, it is certain that
the Supreme Court considers voluntariness of involvement vital,
and the Court requires some "public controversy" which cannot
begin with the defamatory statement.6 6 Some courts have interpreted the latter requirement as involving matters of legitimate

62. See Harris v. Tomczak, 94 F.R.D. 687 (E.D. Cal. 1982); Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc.,
627 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980); Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc.,
580 F.2d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 1978) ("[l1t falls within that class of legal abstractions where 'Iknow it when
I see it.' ") (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J.,concurring)).
Two recent Supreme Court cases addressing defamation suits brought by private figures do not appear to
add much to the Court's expression of who are limited purpose public figures. In Philadelphia Newspapers,
Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S.Ct. 1558 (1986), the Court, without revealing its analysis, applied private figure precedent tothe principal stockholder of a convenience store corporation reported tobe benefiting from links with
organized crime. In Dun & Bradstreet v. Greemnoss Builders, 105 S.Ct. 2939 (1985) (plurality opinion) the
Court also dealt with a defamation suit which it found was based on a matter of private concern. The Court
did not specifically consider whether Greenmoss, a construction contractor, was a private figure for purposes
of a false report concerning bankruptcy proceedings circulated among Dun & Bradstreet's subscribers. However,
Justice O'Conner, for the Court in Hepps, considered Greemnoss a private figure. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. at 1563.
63. Fitzgerald, 691 F.2d at 668. The court listed the five requirements as:
(1)the plaintiff had access to channels of effective communication; (2) the plaintiff voluntarily assumed a role of special prominence in a public controversy; (3) outcome of the controversy; (4) the
controversy existed prior to the publication of the defamatory statements; and (5) the plaintiff retained
public figure status at the time of the alleged defamation.
Id.
64. Harris v. Tomczak, 94 F.R.D. at 703. Judge Karlton defined a limited-purpose public figure as: "a
person who, by voluntary and intentional conduct, has vigorously sought to directly influence resolution of
a particular controversy, identifiable as such from the intended audience's perception, resolution of which can
reasonably be said to have a perceptible impact on persons other than the immediate participants in the controversy." Id. The court went on to state that "the allegedly defamatory statement must be made within the
scope of the particular controversy and must be reasonably related to that controversy." Id.
65. Jenoff v. Hearst Corp., 644 F.2d 1004, 1007-08 (4th Cir. 1981). See Note, Defining a Public Controversy in the Constitutional Law of Defamation, 69 VA. L. REv. 931, 944-56 (1983), for an argument that
the Supreme Court's public controversy requirement has led to confusion and ad hoc application by lower courts
because the Court has not clearly outlined an analytical framework.
66. Jenoff v. Hearst Corp., 644 F.2d 1004, 1007-08 (4th Cir. 1981).
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public concern"" requiring some existing public discussion.6"
Mississippi's NEW STANDARD
In Ferguson, the Mississippi Supreme Court attempted to resolve
what were two different privileges - a state privilege concerning fair comment 9 and the constitutional standard of New York
Times as expanded in Gertz."'
Both deal with protection afforded statements made concerning individuals who have taken public positions."' The Ferguson
court opinion described the Gertz standard of a limited-purpose
public figure as a "vortex public figure." 2 The court characterized the Gertz standard as involving "one who is otherwise a private
figure but who thrusts himself or becomes thrust into the vortex
of a matter of legitimate public interest." 3 The court went on to
state that:
We emphasize that the matter of legitimate public interest need not produce actual controversy. It is enough that the matter is in the public domain. Any person who becomes

67. Levine v. CMP Publications, Inc., 738 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1980); Fitzgerald, 691 F.2d at 669. The
Supreme Court recently adopted the "public concern" standard, at least in its application to private individuals.
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986); Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders,
105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985). In Hepps, Justice O'Conner for the Court summarized precedent by stating that "[wlhen
the speech is of a public concern and the plaintiff is a public official or public figure, the ... plaintiff [must]
surmount a much higher barrier before recovering damages from a media defendant than is raised by the common law." 105 S. Ct. at 1563. Since Hepps did not involve a limited purpose public figure, it is difficult to
tell whether a controversy will no longer be required. This could have a bearing should the Court again address
a case such as Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979). See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
68. Levine, 738 F.2d at 672, where the court stated that public controversy "assumes the existence of some
public debate over matters that legitimately concern the public."; Fitzgerald, 691 F.2d at 668.
69. The court noted Mississippi's recognition of a qualified privilege for fair comment, announced in Edmonds v. Delta Democrat Publishing Co., 230 Miss. 583, 93 So. 2d 171 (1957). The court there said:
When a person comes prominently forward in any way and becomes a public or quasi-public figure,
he invites free expression of public opinion, including criticism. When such criticism is in the form
of an opinion, relates to public assertions or acts rather than to the individual in his private affairs,
is fair in the sense that the reader can understand the factual basis for the opinions containing the criticism, and the publication relates to a matter of public interest, then the occasion is conditionally
privileged; and no action will lie for such publication no matter how severe the criticism or unfavorable the comments, if the privilege is not abused.
230 1S4iss.at 590-91, 93 So. 2d at 173.
70. See supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
71. Ferguson v. Watkins, 448 So. 2d 271, 277 (Miss. 1984). The court noted that several courts have used
similar terms to describe the Gertz limited-purpose public figure, but the court incorrectly stated the term originated in Gertz. While the limited-purpose figure standard was announced in Gertz, the "vortex" term was used
previously to describe General Walker's actions in entering the public controversy which precipitated his defamation suit. Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. at 130, 155 (1967).
72. 448 So. 2d at 277.
73. Id. The court mistakenly characterizes the Gertz limited-purpose public figure standard as requiring
a matter of legitimate public interest. The Supreme Court has always required a public controversy. The difference is major in light of the Mississippi court's position that a matter of legitimate public interest includes any
program of services financed by public funds, a position the Supreme Court clearly rejected in Hutchinson
v. Proxmire. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. In addition, the Mississippi court reads Gertz far too
liberally when it does not qualify Gertz as applying only very rarely to persons who were involuntarily thrust
to the forefront. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 323, 345.
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involved, voluntarily or involuntarily, in any matter of legitimate public interest - and
this certainly includes the method of administration of any program of services financed
in whole or in part by public monies-becomes in that context a vortex public figure who
is subject to fair comment."

The court resolved the two privileges stating that while the Mississippi fair comment doctrine "arguably" dealt with only commentary, the court viewed the definition of the "public or quasipublic figure" of Edmonds (or the "Edmonds vortex public figure,
if you will" as the court characterizes it) as broader than the limitedpurpose public figure of Gertz."
Likewise, though more restrictive in its definition of a limitedpurpose public figure, the Mississippi court found that the Gertz
standard, employing the New York Times v. Sullivan actual malice
test, uses a more objective measure of actual malice and applies
to fact as well as commentary and opinion." The court thus combined what it considered the more expansive provisions to arrive
at a new classification.77 Applying its new test, the court found
the plaintiffs were vortex public figures and not entitled to a rein74. 448 So. 2d at 278.
75. Id. at 278-79. The court does not explain in what respect the "Ednonds vortex public figure" is broader
than the limited-purpose public figure of Gertz, and it does not appear this contention bears up under scrutiny.
Edmonds dealt with a vocal proponent of prohibition in the context of a public referendum on liquor. There
could be no doubt that Edmonds had mounted a rostrum to influence a public controversy under the Gertz
definition. The court also looked to Reaves v. Foster, 200 So. 2d 453 (Miss. 1967), a case involving a public
school principal who sought damages for criticism of his administration of theschool amid civil rights fervor.
Though the court in Reaves failed to discuss it, there would seem to be little question that Reaves would be
classed as a public official under the definition from Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1965); see supra note
17. As a public official, his official acts are open to discussion and there is no need for the court to ascertain
the existence of a public controversy, or to find any amount of involvement, voluntary or otherwise. Indeed,
the language of Edmonds that the court seems to rely on appears much closer to the Gertz analysis. See supra
note 69, where Edmonds is cited as providing that a person who comes prominently forward "in any way"
is subject to fair comment. Contrary to what the court in Ferguson holds, this language seems to require the
mounting of a rostrum.
The court also cites several other decisions involving law enforcement officers (NAACP v. Moody, 350
So. 2d 1365 (Miss. 1977); Arnold v. Quillian, 262 So. 2d 414 (Miss. 1972); Pride v. Quitman County Voters
League, 226 So. 2d 735 (Miss. 1969), and a political candidate (Perkins v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 241
So. 2d 139 (Miss. 1970)) which lent themselves toapplication of either the fair comment or the New York
Times privilege. It would seem that the types of plaintiffs mentioned by the court would again fall within the
public official definitions. In none of the cases directly above did the court analyze the Edmonds doctrine and
it does not appear that, with the exception of the political candidate, any of the law enforcement officer plaintiffs would fit the Edmonds requirements. It is difficult to understand how the Fergusoncourt finds the Edmonds
definition of a quasi-public figure as any broader than that of Gertz. The court seems to say it arises by implication as a result of misguided or incomplete analysis in previous cases applying the Edmonds standard.
76. 448 So. 2d at 278.
77. The court stated:
[Wle hold that under the law of this state all otherwise actionable utterences - commentary, opinion
or fact - made regarding a public figure or a vortex public figure are qualifiedly privileged. The qualification on the privilege is that the person defamed may yet recover if he proves that at the time of
the utterance the defendant either (a) knew clearly that the utterance was false, defamatory and otherwise actionable, or (b) acted in reckless disregard of whether it was false, defamatory and otherwise
actionable.
448 So. 2d at 279.
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statement of the jury verdict because they failed to prove actual
malice. 8
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

There appears to be little quarrel with the result in Ferguson,
but there are problems with the court's analysis and questions concerning the new test which should be answered. First, though the
Mississippi court is correct in its determination that nothing said
in Gertz requires a stricter view of who is a limited-purpose public
figure, it is questionable that Mississippi precedent backs up the
court's view that the Edmonds quasi-public figure definition is
broader than that of Gertz.79 The Mississippi court has given a
public figure flavor to plaintiffs in cases involving persons who
would rightly be considered public officials. The separate rationales for requiring public officials and public figures to prove actual
malice calls upon the Mississippi court to reevaluate its extension of the public figure doctrine in Ferguson. It is submitted that
a Gertz standard would more closely follow the Mississippi precedent concerning when a private individual must prove actual malice
in a defamation suit. But barring adoption of a Gertz standard,
the Mississippi court should resolve important questions concerning the scope of its new test.
The Mississippi court in Ferguson essentially adopted a Rosenbloom standard by another name. ° In the process it appears the
court has left itself with the same ad hoc determinations of what
is a matter of legitimate public interest which the Supreme Court
has rejected. The court does mention that administration of public monies is a matter of legitimate public concern, but the court
should go farther and develop a framework to give guidance to
lower courts.
The Utah Supreme Court, interpreting a state statute, has provided a workable starting point.81 The Utah court held that public
interest included matters relating to the "public health and safety
...legitimate issue[s] with respect to functioning of governmental
bodies, officials, or public institutions, or with respect to matters
involving the expenditure of public funds."' 2
This standard would require refinement: there is nothing to help
differentiate legitimate from frivolous issues. However, adopting this standard is at least an initial step the Mississippi court
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968 (Utah 1981).
Id. at 978.
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should take to alleviate the ambiguity of its decision in Ferguson.
In addition, the Mississippi court should clarify its use of the term
"involvement." The court states that those potential defamation
plaintiffs who become involved in a matter of legitimate public
interest will be required to prove actual malice. However, the court
relies on Edmonds where it was said that only those who come
"prominently forward in any way" become public figures. Is
involvement a lesser standard than prominence? It would appear
so, but the court in Ferguson also looks to the plaintiffs' affirmative act of sending an ultimatum as proof they had become public
figures. It stops short of saying this affirmative act was required
to meet the involvement requirement. An argument could be made
that merely being employed at the hospital where public monies
are being administered constitutes involvement in a matter of legitimate public interest. The court should give more focus to this
requirement.
Greg Weber

